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Abstract
Although parties focus disproportionately on favorable issues in their election
campaigns, it is also the case that parties spend much of the ‘short campaign’ ad-
dressing the same issues – and especially salient issues. If able to influence the
importance of issues for voters through their emphasis, it is puzzling that parties
spend any time on unfavorable issue positions. We suggest that while parties pre-
fer to emphasize popular issue positions, they also face an additional incentive to
emphasize issues that are salient to voters: clarifying their positions on these is-
sues for sympathetic voters. Leveraging the surprise general election victory of the
British Conservative party in 2015—which brought about a hitherto unexpected
referendum on EU membership—we show that, consistent with this hypothesis,
voter uncertainty is especially costly for parties on salient issues. We formalize this
argument using a model of party strategy with endogenous issue salience.
∗We are grateful to Bing Powell, Bonnie Meguid, Jim Johnson, Avi Acharya, Jim Adams, Sergio
Ascencio, Rob Carroll, Mike Gibilisco, Tasos Kalandrakis and Michael Thies for their suggestions and
thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this paper. This paper has also benefited from suggestions
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London School of Economics, the URDPS Comparative Politics Workshop and the URDPS Women’s
Working Group. This paper is significantly based on work previously circulated under the title “Policy
Bundling: A Model of Party Strategy in Multi-Issue Elections.”
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1 Introduction
A vast body of work on what might variously be described as ‘heresthetics’, ‘issue com-
petition’, ‘saliency theory’ or ‘issue ownership theory’ (Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie
1983; Riker 1993; Petrocik 1996; Green-Pedersen 2007) has argued that parties primarily
compete by drawing voters’ attention to particular issues, in an effort to alter the di-
mensions on which they are evaluated.1 To date, researchers have amassed considerable
evidence from a wide range of countries that parties do focus disproportionately on is-
sues that favor them.2 However, the incentives described in these studies cannot entirely
explain issue selection by parties in campaigns.
In particular, contrary to what might be expected under saliency or ownership theory,
it is well-established that parties actually spend much of their campaigns focusing on the
same issues as each other – and in particular, on issues which are already salient to voters.3
Most commonly, this has been explained as resulting from the importance of particular
issues to voters. It is reasoned, for instance, that parties may not want to ignore issues
of public concern that are the subject of extensive media coverage (Ansolabehere and
Iyengar 1994; Aldrich and Griffin 2003), as this may relinquish control over the framing
of the issue to their opponents. It is also possible that parties may be forced to confront
unfavorable but salient issues by their political opponents and by the media.4 Yet, few
studies have satisfactorily explained why, if a party is able to influence the salience of a
preferred issue, it will devote any time to an issue on which it is disadvantaged, even if
this is an important issue for voters.5
We observe that the extent to which a party emphasizes an issue can have two effects
1A large empirical and experimental literature on the importance of “priming effects” argues that
political advertising has a significant effect on voters’ issue priorities (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick
and Kinder 1990).
2For instance, Green and Hobolt (2008) observe that during the 2005 British elections, both Labour
and the Conservatives campaigned predominantly on their respective ‘owned’ issues, while Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) note that during the period of left-wing governments in Denmark between
1993 and 2001, the right-wing opposition continually drew attention to immigration, an issue on which
it was favored by voters. Other studies with similar findings include Druckman, Jacobs and Ostermeier
(2004), Vavreck (2009), Dolezal et al. (2014) and de Sio and Weber (2014).
3This has been particularly noted in U.S. presidential and congressional campaigns (Kahn and Kenney
1999; Aldrich and Griffin 2003; Damore 2004, 2005; Sigelman and Buell 2004; Kaplan, Park and Ridout
2006; Sides 2006; Milita, Ryan and Simas 2014), but has also been observed in multiparty contexts like
Austria and Denmark (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Dolezal et al. 2014; Meyer and Wagner
2015). For instance, when analyzing presidential campaigns in the U.S., Sigelman and Buell (2004)
found that both candidates spoke on the same issue, on average, a staggering 73% of the time.
4In keeping with this logic, Sides (2006) notes that both the Democrats and the Republicans focused
on Social Security, education and health care in campaigns for U.S. House and Senate races in 1998—
the issues most prominent on the public’s agenda at the time—while Kaplan, Park and Ridout (2006)
identify a sizeable effect of issue salience on candidates’ emphases in Senate campaigns.
5For an important exception, see Minozzi (2014), who argues that disadvantaged parties will choose
to campaign on salient issues in order to improve their reputation on such issues.
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on voters: it may influence the importance of the issue for voters, but it may also influence
voters’ certainty regarding the party’s position on the issue. Based on this observation,
we propose one reason parties may choose to engage with voters on issues where their
position is unpopular with a majority of voters: clarifying their position on such issues
for the benefit of potentially sympathetic voters, and particularly on salient issues. We
suggest that this incentive coexists and competes with parties’ more studied incentive
to address and emphasize the issues on which their policy positions are popular. We
contend that this may account for why we observe parties competing by trying to focus
voters’ attention on issues where their positions are more popular, while simultaneously
being compelled to emphasize issues on which voters’ attention is already focused.
This is in keeping with a sizable literature arguing that the more uncertain a voter is
about candidate positions, the less likely she is to support the candidate (Alvarez 1998).6
However, this argument may seem at odds with recent research that, instead, stresses
the electoral benefits of positional ambiguity (Campbell 1983; Alesina and Holden 2008;
Tomz and van Houweling 2009; Rovny 2012; Kartik, van Weelden and Wolton 2015;
Somer-Topcu 2015). We counter that this line of reasoning confounds two distinct at-
tributes: voter uncertainty regarding parties’ true positions, and candidate or party am-
biguity.7 While closely related, these attributes are conceptually distinct: uncertainty is
‘a psychological state in which voters are unsure about the policy positions of candidates’,
while ambiguity is ‘an attribute of candidate [or party] position taking’ (Tomz and van
Houweling 2009, 83).8 We possess considerable evidence that strategic ambiguity—when
parties take ‘vaguely broad positions’ on select issues9—may be electorally beneficial,
whether due to ‘projection’ by partisan voters, or a perception that ambiguity on an is-
sue indicates ‘flexibility’. However, evasion by parties or candidates, especially on salient
issues, cannot be excused by voters on these same grounds. That Tomz and van Houwel-
ing (2009) find risk-averse voters who are certain about their own position least likely to
embrace ambiguous candidates seems consistent with this claim.10
6For other studies that argue similarly, see Enelow and Hinich (1981), Shepsle (1972), Bartels (1986),
Gill (2005) and Ezrow, Homola and Tavits (2014).
7Aldrich, Ley and Schober (2013) also draw a distinction between voter uncertainty and candidate or
party ambiguity, investigating the implications of each for voters’ ability to place parties on a left-right
scale.
8Other studies that reference such distinctions include Aldrich, Ley and Schober (2013) and Milita,
Ryan and Simas (2014).
9For instance, Alesina and Holden (2008) and Kartik, van Weelden and Wolton (2015) both explicitly
model ambiguity as candidates choosing an interval on an issue dimension rather than a single point,
while in their survey experiment, Tomz and van Houweling (2009) ask respondents to consider candidates
who take a position within some specified range. In Somer-Topcu’s analysis, a ‘broad-appeal’ strategy
can encompass parties taking clear but multiple positions on various issues, or a party selecting centrist
candidates while releasing an extreme election manifesto (Somer-Topcu 2015, 843).
10Tomz and van Houweling (2009, 96) further qualify their findings with the statement that “[v]oters
may, for example, accept ambiguity within the range we studied but shun candidates who are totally
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We present further empirical evidence in support of this claim. We leverage the sur-
prise general election victory of the Conservative party in the United Kingdom on 8 May
2015, which prompted a hitherto unexpected referendum on Britain’s membership of the
European Union (EU), as an exogenous shock to the salience of the issue of EU mem-
bership in British public opinion. Using individual-party level panel data from Britain
between March 2014 and July 2016, we show that an individual was less likely to vote for
a party if uncertain about its position on the EU membership after May 2015, but not
before. To further investigate this mechanism, we distinguish between respondents who
expected, in May 2016, that Britain would vote to leave the EU, and those who expected
a vote to remain. We find that, among those expecting a remain vote, uncertainty about
a party’s position on the EU only reduced their support for that party after Britain nar-
rowly voted to leave the EU on 23 June 2016, but did not significantly influence their
vote choice before this date. By comparison, we identify a sharp increase in the effect of
uncertainty regarding parties’ EU stances on the preferences of those expecting a leave
vote in May 2015 itself. Assuming that, between May 2015 and June 2016, the issue of
Britain’s membership of the EU was more salient to those expecting a leave vote than
those expecting a vote to remain, these findings cumulatively support the claim that
voter uncertainty regarding a party’s position on an issue is costly, and especially costly
on salient issues.
Using a formal model, we show that incorporation of this ‘clarity’ incentive into a
model of party strategy with endogenous issue salience can explain why parties may
campaign on unfavorable issues, and especially when these are salient to voters. In our
model, parties take distinct policy positions on two issues, X and Y and strategically
choose which issues to emphasise in order to maximise their vote share. There are two
reasons for a party to emphasise an issue. First, emphasizing an issue increases the
proportion of voters that considers the issue important, which may be advantageous to
a party if its position on the issue is relatively popular. Second, there is the ‘clarity
incentive’. That is, emphasizing an issue increases the proportion of voters that are
aware of the party’s position on the issue. This benefits the party electorally because
voters are less inclined to vote for a party if they do not know its position on a salient
issue. We show that, under certain conditions on the parameters, both parties choose
to emphasize both issues. Nevertheless, parties tend to emphasize more salient issues
relatively more and also emphasize issues on which they are advantaged relatively more.
We view this as a significant advance over earlier theoretical work on parties’ salience
strategies. While there exists a small body of work seeking to formally model parties’ issue
selection strategies (Austen-Smith 1993; Simon 2002; Amoro´s and Puy 2013; Ascencio
vague.”
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and Gibilisco 2014; Aragoneˆs, Castanheira and Giani 2015; Egorov 2015; Dragu and Fan
2016), most of these studies do not find parties addressing the same issues in equilibrium,
and none of these studies have been able to explain why parties might address issues they
do not already ‘own’ – contrary to the empirical evidence.11 We believe that our model is
one of only a few models of issue selection that find opposing parties campaigning on the
same issue in equilibrium, and the only model which finds that parties will campaign on
unfavorable, or non-owned, issues if these are especially salient to voters – as is consistent
with the empirical evidence.
2 Is Evasion Costly? Some Empirical Evidence
2.1 Background
The issue of European Union membership and integration has long been a thorn in
the side of both Labour and Conservative party elites in Britain – and one that seems
no less likely to subside even after a narrow popular vote in favor of ‘Brexit’ on 23
June 2016. For several decades, both major parties have included ‘Eurosceptics’ and
‘Europhiles’ – the former being those in favor of weakening European integration or
leaving the EU altogether, and the latter those in favor of continuing EU membership and
further integration. For instance, in 1975, in response to worsening intra-party divisions
over continuing European Economic Community membership, a Labour government held,
and won, a referendum on this question (Butler and Kitzinger 2016).
However, in recent decades, it is the Conservative party which has been more riven by
divisions on the question of EU membership in the face of further European integration.
Between 1992 and 1995, Conservative prime minister John Major faced repeated rebel-
lions by MPs over the implementation of the Maastricht treaty in British law (Sowemimo
1996)– with some of the rebels eventually joining the fledgling United Kingdom Inde-
pendence Party (UKIP). Again, and for an assortment of reasons, tensions within the
Conservative party over the European question mounted over the course of the 2010–15
parliament (Lynch 2015).13 The 2010–15 parliament witnessed Conservative rebellions
11Studies only find parties campaigning on the same issue when parties have roughly equal abilities on
both issue dimensions (Egorov 2015), when parties share ownership of an issue (Ascencio and Gibilisco
2014), or when a party is favored by voters on both issues (Amoro´s and Puy 2013). Meanwhile, in the
model presented by Aragoneˆs, Castanheira and Giani (2015), while parties may ‘invest’ in the quality
of their proposals on the same issue in equilibrium, parties never devote time to more than one issue in
their campaigns. Similarly, Dragu and Fan (2016) find that parties will never advertise the same policy
issue in equilibrium.12
13Lynch (2015, 193) highlights the role of the following factors: “the Eurozone crisis, the dilution
of Conservative policy in coalition, the growth of hard Euroscepticism on the Conservative benches,
ineffectual party management and the rise of UKIP.”
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on 49 votes relating to the EU by 103 different MPs, including two Private Member’s
Bills and one amendment calling for an ‘in-out’ referendum on EU membership. In 2013,
viewing this in combination with growing support for UKIP among 2010 Conservative
voters,14 Conservative party leader David Cameron announced that should the Conser-
vatives win the 2015 general election he would renegotiate Britain’s relationship with
the EU, and then hold a referendum on EU membership. By promising a referendum,
Cameron hoped to defuse future rebellions by Eurosceptic MPs, as well as draw voters
gravitating towards UKIP back within the Conservative fold.
Crucially, much of the public, and most contemporary commentators, did not think it
likely that the Conservatives would win an outright majority in the next general election.
Throughout 2013, the Labour party maintained a comfortable lead over the Conservative
party in opinion polls. While the Labour lead narrowed in the months and days leading
up to the May 2015 general election, the electoral arithmetic was such that it was widely
assumed the next government would require some coalition arrangement involving one
of the two major parties. This meant that a referendum on Britain’s membership of
the EU seemed a distant prospect to most even on election day. Consequently, that
the Conservative party had secured a 7% lead over the Labour party—and so obtained
an outright majority of seats in parliament—came as a shock to pollsters, pundits, and
also to David Cameron.15 The scale of the surprise prompted a nationwide inquiry
into the methods used by British pollsters, which concluded that pollsters had been
systematically oversampling politically engaged voters, who tended to disproportionately
favor the Labour party (Mellon and Prosser 2016).
As Figure 1 illustrates, the salience of EU membership in public opinion increased
substantially between May 2015 and May 2016 – very likely as a consequence of this
unexpected result, and so the prospect of a referendum on this issue. In particular,
whereas only 0.7% of respondents considered the EU the most important issue facing the
country right before the May 2015 general election, 1.3% did so within a few weeks of the
result. By May 2016—with a month to go until the referendum on EU membership—the
proportion of respondents considering the EU the most important issue facing the country
had grown to 9.5%.16 We observe an even more substantial increase in the salience of
14UKIP obtained an average of 23% in wards that it contested in the 2013 local elections, and had
consistently scored above 10% in public opinion polls from 2012 onwards. One of the central components
of UKIPs platform was an ‘in-out’ referendum on EU membership was a central, and widely known,
component of UKIP’s platform.
15On David Cameron’s response to his surprise election victory, see ‘U.K. Conservatives’ Euphoria
Over Election Victory Tempered By Prospect of Future Battles’ by Conal Urquhart and Naina Bajekal,
published in Time magazine on 8 May 2015.
16I measure the salience of the EU in British public opinion using data from the British Election Study
Internet Panel survey series, waves 1 to 10 (conducted between May 2014–November 2016). To measure
issue salience, I calculated the share of individual responses to the‘most important issue’ question which
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Figure 1: The Salience of the European Union in British Public Opinion
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EU membership in British public opinion after the referendum, in which the electorate
narrowly voted to leave the European Union. For instance, whereas 9.6% of respondents
considered EU membership the most important issue facing the country in June 2016,
33.6% of respondents held this view by November 2016.
2.2 Empirical Approach
We thus view the May 2015 general election result as an exogenous shock to the salience of
the European Union for the British public. Using data from Waves 1 to 10 of the British
Election Study Internet Panel survey series (collected between May 2014 and November
2016), we are able to examine the effect of this increase in the salience of the EU on
its importance for vote choice. We hypothesize that voters are less likely to vote for a
party if they are uncertain about their position on an issue, and especially if that issue is
salient to them. Consequently, parties possess an incentive to address unfavorable issues,
especially when an issue is salient to voters.
In estimating the effect of voter uncertainty on vote choice, studies have typically
resorted to indirect measures of uncertainty. Most prominently, in his analysis of voting
mentioned the ‘European Union’, ‘Brexit’, ‘leave’, or ‘remain’, in each wave.
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behavior during the 1980 U.S. presidential election, Bartels (1986) obtains predicted
probabilities of non-response for each respondent using a probit model of non-response
(with a variety of demographic and political characteristics as regressors), and uses each
predicted probability as an individual-level measure of uncertainty. Berinsky and Lewis
(2007) use the same approach in their analysis of voter risk aversion and its implications
for vote choice under uncertainty. While the two-stage approach is essential if one is trying
to estimate the relevant parameters of a voter utility model – as both these studies aim to
do – it is, however, only able to estimate the effect of that component of voter uncertainty
that is determined by these observable characteristics, and which largely vary between
individuals, rather than varying for the same individual across parties. This seems,
if anything, likely to attenuate estimates of the effect of voters’ uncertainty on their
vote choice17, and does not necessarily comment on the implications of variation in an
individual voter’s certainty regarding parties’ positions on an issue for her choice among
parties. Moreover, with the exception of Tomz and van Houweling (2009) – who use a
survey experiment to isolate the causal effect of candidate ambiguity on voter preferences
– these studies have not attempted to deal directly with the possible endogeneity that may
result from either the tendency of voters to find out more about parties that they already
favor, or from voters’ tendency to over-estimate the precision of positions expressed by
parties they like, or to project their own views onto such parties.
In an effort to ameliorate these concerns, we compare the effect of uncertainty regard-
ing a party’s position on Britain’s EU membership on an individual’s preferences before
and after the May 2015 general election result – which, we argue, unexpectedly increased
the salience of the EU for voters. This allows us to rely solely on within-individual vari-
ation across waves in uncertainty, party preference and issue salience in order to identify
the relationship of interest. We restrict our attention to individuals included in all rel-
evant waves of the panel, which leaves us with a panel of 7, 237 respondents. We also
restrict our attention to the three British parties for which data was most complete: the
Labour party, the Conservative party and the Liberal Democratic party. For our main
specification, we estimate the following regression equation using OLS:
Yijt = XijtD
<GE
t β1 +XijtD
>GE
t β2 + αji + θjt + φjk + uij
Here, Yijt is a vector containing each respondent i’s self-reported likelihood of ever voting
for party j in wave t, and Xijt is a dummy variable measuring whether respondent i was
17Indeed, Bartels (1986) notes that his parameter estimates are only able to account for about a
quarter of the total variance in non-response for the issues included in his model. As long as the imputed
measure of voter uncertainty is noisy, estimates of the effect of uncertainty on vote choice may be subject
to attenuation bias.
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able to place party j on the issue of EU membership in wave t.18 The variable D< GEt
takes the value 1 if wave t was completed before 8 May 2015, and 0 otherwise. The reverse
applies to D> GEt. In an alternate specification, we also estimate the above regression
equation with separate dummies for each wave t, which allows us to estimate a wave-
specific coefficient on the effect of uncertainty regarding a party’s EU membership position
on individual preferences. In all specifications, we include individual-party, party-wave
and party-constituency fixed effects—indexing constituencies by k—and report standard
errors clustered by individual.
The inclusion of individual-party fixed effects is important, as this eliminates possible
bias due to individuals’ propensity to take less interest in the campaigns of less-preferred
parties. On the other hand, the inclusion of party-wave fixed effects means that our esti-
mates are not biased by the possibility that respondents were less able to place a party on
the EU issue in some waves relative to others (e.g., over the course of the EU referendum
campaign). Finally, party-constituency fixed effects control for any constituency-specific
differences in respondents’ preferences over parties.
2.3 Results and Discussion
Table 1 reports OLS coefficient estimates from several specifications of interest. Across
specifications, we find that respondents were more likely to penalize a party if uncertain
about their position on EU membership after the 2015 general election, than before. We
attribute this to the increased salience of the EU after the shock Conservative victory,
which made an ‘in-out’ referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU a certainty in the
near future. Model 1 estimates a single coefficient for all waves prior to the 2015 general
election, and similarly for all waves after. We do not estimate that uncertainty regarding
parties’ EU position had a statistically significant effect on preferences before the 2015
general election. However, we find that, after the 2015 election, on average, respondents
were 2.18% less likely to vote for a party if they could not identify their position on EU
membership than if they could do so. Next, Model 2 re-estimates the main specification
after allowing for a separate coefficient on voter uncertainty for each wave. The results of
this analysis reaffirm that there was a sudden, but persistent, increase in the importance
of respondents’ uncertainty regarding party positions on EU membership for vote choice
immediately after the 2015 general election. These results are consistent with the claim
that voters penalize parties if uncertain about their position on salient issues.
18The precise question asked of respondents was the following: ‘Some people feel that Britain should
do all it can to unite fully with the European Union. Other people feel that Britain should do all it can
to protect its independence from the European Union. Where would you place yourself and the political
parties on this [0–10 point] scale?’ This question was included in waves 1–4 and waves 6–9 of the British
Election Study Internet Panel survey series.
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Table 1: OLS Analysis of Voter Uncertainty on EU Placement Effect on Party Choice
Likelihood of Vote for Party j
(1) Full Sample (2) Full Sample (3) Expecting Remain (4) Expecting Leave
EUj DK × before GE −0.083
(0.056)
EUj DK × after GE −0.218∗∗∗
(0.044)
Pre-GE Waves
EUj DK × Wave 1 −0.122 0.046 −0.208∗∗
(0.078) (0.138) (0.096)
EUj DK × Wave 2 −0.106 −0.139 −0.095
(0.102) (0.163) (0.129)
EUj DK × Wave 3 0.080 0.146 0.045
(0.091) (0.143) (0.116)
EUj DK × Wave 4 −0.170 −0.114 −0.200
(0.090) (0.144) (0.115)
Post-GE Waves
EUj DK × Wave 6 −0.297∗∗∗ −0.221 −0.344∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.154) (0.122)
EUj DK × Wave 7 −0.163∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗ −0.151∗∗
(0.054) (0.088) (0.069)
EUj DK × Wave 9 −0.244∗∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.092) (0.068)
Observations 72,979 72,979 29,160 43,819
No. of Respondents 7,237 7,237 2,884 4,353
R2 0.882 0.882 0.886 0.878
Note: ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Cell entries report OLS coefficient estimates from a fixed effects model of voter preferences over
parties in Britain. Parties included in the analysis were: the Labour party, the Conservative party, and
the Liberal Democratic party. All models include individual-party, party-wave and constituency-party
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are given in parentheses.
10
Figure 2: Voter Uncertainty on EU Placement and Party Choice in Britain
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Note: These figures plot coefficient estimates for the main regressor of interest from Models 2, 3 and 4
in Table 1, respectively. We classify an individual as expecting Britain to remain in the EU if, between
6 May 2016 and 22 June 2016 (Wave 8), they assigned p < 0.5 to a Leave vote. Conversely, we classify
an individual as expecting Britain to leave the EU if they assigned p ≥ 0.5 to a Leave victory within the
same timeframe.
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Models 3 and 4 re-examine the relationship between voter uncertainty and party
preference in two separate subsamples: among respondents expecting a vote for ‘Remain’
in the EU referendum, and, conversely, among respondents expecting a vote for ‘Leave’.
The results of these analyses are presented graphically in Figure 2. Respondents were
classified as belonging to the former category if they assigned p < 0.5 to a Leave vote
between 6 May 2016 and 22 June 2016, and to the latter category if they assigned p ≥ 0.5
to the same outcome within the same timeframe. We expect that respondents anticipating
a Leave vote would be more likely to consider Britain’s EU membership a salient issue
immediately following the May 2015 election result, whereas respondents anticipating a
Remain vote would be more likely to consider Britain’s EU membership a salient issue
only during the short referendum campaign and after the referendum result to leave the
EU. Consistent with this reasoning, we find that, for respondents anticipating a Remain
vote, uncertainty regarding party positions on Britain’s EU membership only became
a significant predictor of party preference during the short campaign and after Britain
voted for ‘Brexit’. By contrast, for respondents anticipating a Leave vote, uncertainty
regarding party positions on Britain’s EU membership became a significant predictor of
party preference immediately after the general election result.
3 Formalization of Argument
In this section, we formally explore the implications of the ‘clarity incentive’ for party
strategy using a model of electoral competition with two vote-maximizing parties and
two issues. We describe party positions and voter behavior in turn, before discussing
their joint implications for the equilibrium party emphasis strategies.
3.1 Parties
There are two parties – denoted L and R – which compete for votes over issues X and
Y . On each issue, the position of each party j is denoted xj and yj, respectively. As
in previous models of endogenous issue salience (Amoro´s and Puy 2013; Dragu and Fan
2016), parties’ issue positions are exogenously given. We assume that 0 < xL, yL <
1
2
and
1
2
< xR, yR < 1, implying that party L has a left-wing position on both issues, and party R
a right-wing position on both issues. Additionally, we assume that |xL−xm| < |xR−xm|
and |yR − ym| < |yL − ym|, where xm = ym = 12 is the position of the median voter on
each issue. This indicates that party L’s position is closer to the median voter on issue
X than on Y , and party R’s position is closer to the median voter on issue Y than on X.
Although party positions are exogenously given, each party is able to choose a level
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of emphasis on each issue.19 eXL and e
Y
R denote the level of emphasis placed by each party
on each issue, respectively, where 0 ≤ eXL ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ eYR ≤ 1. These constraints capture
the notion that both parties have limited resources, and therefore cannot increase their
emphasis on an issue indefinitely. Additionally, by increasing their emphasis on one issue,
parties must devote less time to the other issue. This is formalized in the requirement
that eXL = 1 − eYL and eYR = 1 − eXR .20 As we discuss below, the extent to which a party
emphasizes each issue has two consequences: it influences the salience of issues X and Y
for voters, and also influences the certainty with which voters observe the party’s position
on each issue.
3.2 Voters
There exists a continuum of voters, with voters’ ideal points uniformly distributed on
each issue. Some fraction of voters only care about issue X and some fraction only care
about issue Y . These fractions are determined endogenously, as will be discussed below.
Voters who care only about issue X have ideal points uniformly distributed over the [0, 1]
interval for issue X, and similarly for those voters who care only about issue Y . Voters’
utility functions are as follows:
Uij(xj) = −(xˆi − xj)2
Uij(yj) = −(yˆi − yj)2
where Uij(·) measures how much voter i likes party j. Here, xj and yj denote the positions
chosen by each party j on issues X and Y respectively, and xˆi and yˆi denote the ideal
points of voter i on issues X and Y respectively. Thus, each individual voter’s support
for a party is decreasing in her squared distance from the party’s position on the issue
she cares about.
Without loss of generality, let ψX denote the proportion of voters who care about
issue X and prefer L on issue X, with 1− ψX denoting the proportion of issue X voters
that prefer R on issue X. Similarly, let ψY denote the proportion of issue Y voters that
prefer R on issue Y , with 1 − ψY of issue Y voters preferring L’s position. ψX and ψY
19This follows from the rationale that party platforms are considerably less flexible than the issues
on which they choose to campaign. This may be because of institutional factors anchoring parties to
particular policy positions (for instance, links with religious organizations or trade unions), or because
parties fear voters might perceive them as “irresponsible” (Downs 1957; de Sio and Weber 2014).
20Alternatively, we may model parties as choosing their level of emphasis on each issue independently,
but requiring that their total emphasis on both issues not exceed one. It is easy to show that parties
will never choose a level of emphasis on each issue such that this constraint does not bind.
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are formally defined as follows:
ψX =
∫ 1
0
1{UL(xL, xaL) > UR(xR, xaR)} dxi
ψY =
∫ 1
0
1{UL(yL, yaL) < UR(yR, yaR)} dyi
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function, 0 ≤ ψX ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ψY ≤ 1.
There are two types of voters: ‘impressionable’, and ‘non-impressionable’. Impres-
sionable voters are those whose issue priorities are influenced by the extent to which
parties emphasize each issue, whereas non-impressionable voters are those whose issue
priorities are inflexible. The proportion of impressionable voters in the populace is given
by α, where 0 < α < 1. In effect, α determines the sensitivity of the electoral salience of
each issue to parties’ issue emphases in their campaigns. We discuss the voting behavior
of each type of voter in turn.
3.3 Non-Impressionable Voters
Each non-impressionable voter cares only about one issue and this issue is assumed to be
insensitive to party campaigning. Fraction piX non-impressionable voters care only about
issue X, and fraction piY non-impressionable voters care only about issue Y . Since all
voters care about one of the two issues, we impose piX + piY = 1. We refer to piX and piY
as the salience of issues X and Y for non-impressionable voters.
The extent to which voters observe a party’s campaign on an issue depends on the
degree to which the party emphasizes that issue. For non-impressionable voters, the
proportion who observe the campaign of party j on issue k ∈ {X, Y } is given by θNη(ekj )
where θN ∈ (0, 1] is a constant, ekJ is party j’s emphasis on issue k, and η(·) is a strictly
increasing, continuously differentiable and (weakly) concave function, with η(0) = 0 and
η(1) = 1. Therefore, if party j does not emphasize issue X, for instance, at all, then
θNη(e
X
j ) = θNη(0) = 0 and so no non-impressionable voters observe party j’s campaign
on the issue. If party j talks solely about issue X, then θNη(e
X
j ) = θNη(1) = θN and so
fraction θN non-impressionable voters observe j’s campaign on the issue. For convenience,
we use ηkj to denote η(e
k
j ), where j ∈ {L,R}, k ∈ {X, Y }. For each non-impressionable
voter, the probability that the voter observes L’s campaign on an issueK is independent of
the probability that the voter observes R’s campaign on the issue and is also independent
of the voter’s policy preferences.
Whether a non-impressionable voter observes a party’s campaign on an issue matters
because it determines the probability that the voter observes the party’s position on the
issue. If a non-impressionable voter who cares only about issue K ∈ {X, Y } observes both
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parties’ campaigns on the issue then she observes both parties’ positions on that issue.
However, if a voter observes only one party’s campaign on the issue, she will observe
that party’s position with probability 1 and its opponent’s position with probability 1
2
.
The implicit assumption here is that observing one party’s campaign improves a voter’s
understanding of both the issue positions taken by that party and the positions taken by
their opponents.
It follows from the previous discussion that the non-impressionable voter i, who cares
about issue K sees the parties’ positions with the following probabilities:
1. Sees only L’s position on K with probability:
θNηKL (1− θNηKR )
2
2. Sees only R’s position on K with probability:
θNηKR (1− θNηKL )
2
3. Sees both parties’ positions on K with probability:
θN2ηKL η
K
R +
θNηKL (1− θNηKR )
2
+
θNηKR (1− θNηKL )
2
4. Sees neither parties’ positions on K with probability:
(1− θNηKL )(1− θNηKR )
Finally, we assume that voters are ambiguity averse in the sense of Epstein (1999)
and do not have any knowledge of parties’ positions unless they observe them in the
campaign. Recall that voters are issue voters, each voter basing her voting decision on
only one of the two issues. It is assumed that if a voter does not observe a party’s position
on the issue the voter thinks is important, then the voter ‘fears the worst’, that the party
could be extremely distant from the voter in policy terms. Therefore, if a voter observes
one party’s position on the issue K that this voter cares about, but does not observe the
other party’s position, then the voter will always vote for the party whose position she
observes. That is, voters always chooses to vote for ‘the devil they know’ rather than
for a party whose position is unknown. If a voter observes both parties’ positions on the
issue K that she cares about, then voters vote for whichever party’s position gives them
higher utility. So, for instance, of the voters who care about issue X who observe both
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parties’ positions on the issue, fraction ψX will have an ideal point closer to party L and
so will vote for that party and fraction 1 − ψX will vote for party R. Lastly, if a voter
sees neither party’s position on issue K, she will vote for each party with probability 1
2
.
Let V NKL denote party L’s vote share among the non-impressionable voters who care
about issue K. Then, the preceding discussion implies that:
V NKL =
θNηKL (1− θNηKR )
2
+ ψX
(
θN2ηKL η
K
R +
θNηKL (1− θNηKR )
2
+
θNηKR (1− θNηKL )
2
)
+
(1− θNηKL )(1− θNηKR )
2
Furthermore party L’s total vote share among non-impressionable voters is given by
V NL = piXV
NX
L + piY V
NY
L . Party R’s vote shares among non-impressionable voters who
care about issue K and among all non-impressionable voters are given by analogous
expressions.
These expressions for V NKL and V
N
L can be rearranged to give:
V NL = piXψX
(
1 + θNη
X
L
2
)
+ piX(1− ψX)1− θNη
X
R
2
+piY (1− ψY )
(
1 + θNη
Y
L
2
)
+ piY ψY
(
1− θNηYR
2
)
(1)
Since η(·) is a concave, continuously difference and increasing function, it follows that
V NL is jointly concave, continuously differentiable and increasing in (e
X
L , e
Y
L ).
3.4 Impressionable Voters
The behavior of impressionable voters is similar to non-impressionable voters, however
impressionable voters care about whichever issue they see a party campaign on. Im-
pressionable voters are less engaged than non-impressionable voters in general and each
impressionable voter only sees at most one party’s campaign on one issue. An impression-
able voter sees party j’s campaign on issue K with probability θIη
K
j , where, as before,
ηKj = η(e
K
j ) and θI ∈ (0, 14 ] is a constant.21 Then, the impressionable voter sees some
party’s campaign on some issue with probability
∑
K∈{X,Y }
∑
j∈{L,R} θIη
K
j , and sees no
party’s campaign on any issue with probability 1−∑K∈{X,Y }∑j∈{L,R} θIηKj .
Impressionable voters care about the issue on which they see a party’s campaign.
Therefore, the salience of issueK for impressionable voters is given by piK =
∑
j∈{L,R} θIη
K
j .
21θI ≤ 14 is necessary to ensure that the probability of a voter observing a party’s campaign does not
exceed 1.
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This is assumption is designed to capture the idea that the degree to which voters care
about an issue is determined by the degree to which parties campaign on the issue. As
with non-impressionable voters, if an impressionable voter sees party j’s campaign on
issue K, then that voter sees the party j’s position on issue K for certain and sees the
other party’s position on issue K with probability 1
2
. Impressionable voters are ambi-
guity averse, just like non-impressionable voters, and so if an impressionable voter sees
one party’s position and not the other party’s position on the issue K that the voter
cares about, then they will vote for the party whose position they observe. If the im-
pressionable voter sees both party’s positions on the issue that they care about then they
vote for whichever party’s position is closer to their ideal point. Impressionable voters
are assumed to have the same issue preferences as non-impressionable voters. Therefore,
for instance, fraction ψX vote for party L if they care about issue X and observe both
parties’ position on that issue. Finally, if an impressionable voter does not observe any
party’s campaign then they see no party’s position on any issue and vote for each party
with probability 1
2
.
From this discussion, it follows that party L’s vote share among impressionable voters
is given by:
V IL = θIη
X
L
(
1
2
+
ψX
2
)
+ θIη
Y
L
(
1
2
+
1− ψY
2
)
+ θIη
X
R
(
ψX
2
)
+ θIη
Y
R
(
1− ψY
2
)
+
(
1−∑K∈{X,Y }∑j∈{L,R} θIηKj
2
)
(2)
with an analogous expression V IR for party R. Since η(·) is a concave, continuously
difference and increasing function, it follows that V IL is jointly concave, continuously
differentiable and increasing in (eXL , e
Y
L ).
3.5 Equilibrium Party Strategies
We define an equilibrium in this model as a vector of issue emphases (eXj , e
Y
j ) for each
party j and a vote share for each party j, where each party j’s vote share is equal to
(1− α)V Nj + αV Ij , with V Nj and V Ij given according to equations (1) and (2) above, and
each party chooses its issue emphases to maximise its vote share, given the strategy of
the other party and subject to the constraints eXj ∈ [0, 1], eYj = 1− eXj .22
Party j’s problem of choosing emphases to maximize vote share subject to these two
22Given the vote share functions (1) and (2), this corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
between the two parties. At the same time, this is not a Nash equilibrium in the sense that voters are
ambiguity averse and so are not acting to maximise expected utility.
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constraints can be solved by forming the Lagrangian:
Lj = (1− α)V Nj + αV Ij + λjeXj + µj(1− eXj ) + νj(1− eYj − eXj )
where λj, µj and νj are Lagrange multipliers.
V Ij and V
N
j are jointly concave and continuously differentiable in the choice variables
(eXL , e
Y
L ) and so the Kuhn Tucker first order conditions are sufficient for an optimum.
Furthermore, the constraints are all linear and so the constraint qualification is satisfied
and so the Kuhn Tucker conditions are also necessary for an optimum. The first order
conditions for party j can be rearranged to give
(1− α)∂V
N
j
∂eXj
+ α
∂V Ij
∂eXj
− (1− α)∂V
N
j
∂eYj
− α∂V
N
j
∂eYj
+ λj − µj = 0 (3)
where λj ≥ 0, µj ≥ 0 and λjeXj = 0 and µj(1− eXj ) = 0.
Using these conditions, the optimal strategy of each party in equilibrium can be de-
rived easily. Significantly, party R’s issue emphases do not enter the first order condition
(3) for party L (all the terms involving party R’s emphasis either cancel or vanish when
we take the derivatives of V NL and V
I
L with respect to e
X
L and e
Y
L .). Similarly, party L’s
issue emphases do not enter the first order condition for party R. Therefore, the amount
each party wishes to emphasize each issue does not depend on the degree to which the
other party is emphasising the issue. As a consequence, characterising the equilibrium is
relatively straightforward.
Recall that η(0) = 0, η(1) = 1 and η is increasing and concave. We now solve for the
optimal party strategy under two distinct additional assumptions about the η function.
First, we consider the case where η is linear: η(e) ≡ e. Second, we consider the case
where η is strictly concave, and where lime→1 η(e) = 0. The first case implies that the
probability that a voter observes a party’s campaign on an issue is proportional to the
party’s emphasis on the issue. The second case implies that increasing emphasis on an
issue increases the probability that voters observe the party’s campaign on the issue, but
at a decreasing rate.
If η is linear, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. If η(e) ≡ e then, for each value of the parameters ψX , ψY , θN , θI , there
exists an α? ∈ [0, 1) such that, for α > α?, the unique equilibrium is for party L to
choose eXL = 1, e
Y
L = 0 and for party R to choose e
X
R = 0, e
Y
R = 1. If α < α
? the unique
equilibrium is for each party j to choose eXj = 1 if piX > piY , and to choose e
Y
j = 1 if
piX < piY .
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Therefore, with the linear function η, and for sufficiently high α, the unique equilib-
rium involves each party only emphasising the issue on which its position is more popular
with a majority of voters. This is similar to results in the formal literature (e.g. (Austen-
Smith 1993; Simon 2002; Amoro´s and Puy 2013)). The intuitive explanation for this
result is that, when α is high, most voters are impressionable and so the electoral salience
of issues for most voters is determined by parties’ campaigns. As a consequence, each
party prefers to emphasize the issue on which its position is more popular, to increase
the proportion of voters who care about this issue when making their voting decision.23
On the other hand, when α is sufficiently small and η(e) ≡ e , both parties may
instead talk about whichever issue is more salient. This is because, for a low value of α,
most voters are non-impressionable and so parties’ abilities to manipulate the salience of
issues is limited. Instead, the purpose of parties’ campaigns becomes primarily to reveal
their positions to voters, because voters are more likely to vote for parties whose positions
they see, due to voter ambiguity aversion. If most voters consider a particular issue—say,
Y—to be salient, then parties will stand most to gain by revealing their position to voters
on issue Y , and so winning voters who care about this issue. By contrast, parties would
gain less by emphasising the issue that most voters do not think is important—in this
case, issue X—since there are few votes to be gained by revealing one’s position on this
issue. As a consequence, both parties will put all emphasis on the more salient issue.24
We now turn to the case of strictly concave η.
Proposition 2. Suppose that η(·) is strictly concave and that lime→1 η′(e) = 0. Then
there exists a unique equilibrium in which both parties talk about both issues. That is,
eKj > 0 for each K ∈ {X, Y }, j ∈ {L,R}. Party L’s equilibrium emphasis on X is strictly
increasing in piX , strictly increasing in ψX , and strictly increasing in ψY . Similarly, party
L’s emphasis on Y is strictly increasing in piY and strictly decreasing in ψX and ψY .
Symmetrical results hold for party R.
Proof. See Appendix B.
So, once η is sufficiently concave, the equilibrium becomes one where both parties
emphasize both issues. The reason that the result is so different from the linear η case is
that with strict concavity there are diminishing returns to emphasising a particular issue.
If a party does not emphasize an issue at all, small increases of emphasis will considerably
23In some cases, α? = 0, so parties talk about their more popular issue even when all voters are
non-impressionable. This is because parties stand more to gain by revealing popular positions to voters
than by revealing unpopular positions. Therefore, the clarity incentive may, in some cases, lead parties
solely to emphasize their more popular positions.
24Proposition 1 only covers the cases α > α? and α < α?. In the knife-edge case α = α?, parties are
indifferent over different strategies and there is no unique equilibrium.
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increase the proportion of voters who see the party’s campaign on this issue. On the other
hand, if a party talks entirely about an issue, then small decreases of emphasis will not
much reduce the proportion of voters who see the party’s campaign on this issue. It
follows that a party’s campaigns will be seen by the most voters if the party emphasizes
both issues to some degree. Since voters are more likely to vote for a party if they see its
position on the issue they care about, it follows that parties want voters to observe their
campaigns as much as possible. This encourages both parties to emphasize both issues
to some degree.
The comparative statics contained in Proposition 2 are intuitive. When issue X is
more salient—and so piX is higher—parties emphasize this issue more. This is because
when voters primarily care about issue X, parties can gain more votes by revealing their
positions on issue X than on issue Y . Consequently, parties increase their emphasis on
issue X. When ψX is higher, party L’s position on issue X is relatively more popular.
This encourages party L to increase its emphasis on issue X for two reasons: first, in
order to reveal its more popular position to voters, and second, to increase the proportion
of impressionable voters who care about issue X. On the other hand, an increase in ψY
means that party L’s position on issue Y is relatively less popular in comparison to
the position of party R. This encourages L to increase its emphasis on issue X and
correspondingly decrease its emphasis on issue Y . Again this is for two reasons. First,
emphasizing X more and Y less increases the proportion of voters who see the party’s
relatively more popular position on issue X and decreases the proportion who see its
relatively less popular position on issue Y , and second, emphasizing X more and Y less
increases the proportion of impressionable voters who care about issue X, where L’s
position is more popular.
4 Conclusion
Why do parties devote any time to unfavorable issues during their campaigns? Existing
research on issue selection by parties has established that parties spend much of their
campaigns focusing on the same issues as each other, and has also struggled to explain
why, if a party is able to influence the salience of a preferred issue for voters, it will spend
any time on an issue on which its position is unpopular with the majority of voters. We
suggest that one reason parties may choose to engage with voters on such issues is because
doing so reduces voter uncertainty about the party’s position on the issue. This provides
a ‘clarity incentive’ for parties to campaign on the issues that voters care about – since
voters may be disinclined to vote for a party if they do not know its opinion on the issues
that matter. This clarity incentive is distinct from the tendency—already noted in the
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literature—for parties to emphasize issues on which they are favored, in order to increase
the importance of these issues in the minds of voters.
We show evidence from the United Kingdom (UK) to suggest that parties genuinely
do benefit electorally if voters know their policy positions on the issues that matter. In
2014, few if any commentators anticipated that the UK would imminently leave the EU.
A surprise victory for the Conservative Party in May 2015 led to an n-out’ referendum
in June 2016, in which the UK narrowly voted to leave the EU. Rapidly, the UK’s re-
lationship with the EU rose to become one of the most important issues for the British
electorate. Using a panel of UK voters over the 2014-2016 period, we show that a voter
considered themselves less likely to vote for a party if the voter did not know the party’s
position on the EU after May 2015, but that this was not case before May 2015. Further-
more, for those voters that, even after May 2015, expected the UK to remain in the EU,
their uncertainty regarding a party’s position on the issue did not affect their reported
likelihood of voting for that party until after the UK voted to leave in June 2016. We
interpret this as evidence that voters are less likely to vote for a party if the voter is
unsure of the party’s position on an issue of importance.
Motivated by this evidence, we develop a formal model in which the tendency of voters
to avoid parties if they do not know their positions encourages parties to emphasize the
issues that are salient to voters in their campaigns. In our model, we establish the
conditions under which this ‘clarity incentive’ leads parties to place some emphasis on
every issue in campaigns, and also to particularly emphasize issues that are salient to
voters. At the same time, a party chooses to emphasize an issue relatively more if its
position on this issue is relatively more popular, in order to increase the salience of
this issue to voters. Our findings contrast with much of the formal theoretic literature,
which finds that parties should never campaign on issues unfavorable to them. The
‘clarity incentive’ in our model therefore provides an explanation hitherto missing from
the formal literature for why a party might emphasize an unfavorable issue, and also
why multiple parties may campaign on the same issues when these issues are particularly
salient to voters.
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Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
Assume without loss of generality that piY > piX . The proof proceeds in two steps. First
we show that it is optimal for party R to choose eYR = 1 regardless of party L’s decision.
Second, we find α? ∈ [0, 1) such that it is optimal for party L to choose eXL = 1 regardless
of R’s decision provided α > α? and optimal for L to choose eYL = 1 provided α < α
?.
Then, it follows that there is a unique equilibrium in which both parties are emphasising
the issue on which their position is more popular for α > α? and that there is a unique
equilibrium when both parties are emphasising the more salient issue for α < α?. This
proves the result.
Step 1: From equation (3), the first order condition for party R is:
(1− α)∂V
N
R
∂eXR
+ α
∂V IR
∂eXR
− (1− α)∂V
N
R
∂eYR
− α∂V
N
R
∂eYR
+ λR − µR = 0
where λj ≥ 0, µR ≥ 0 and λeXR = 0 and µ(1− eXR ) = 0.
By symmetrical arguments to the derivation of equations (1) and (2), the vote shares
of party R among impressionable and non-impressionable voters are given by:
V NR = piX(1− ψX)
(
1 + θNη
X
R
2
)
+ piXψX
1− θNηXL
2
+ piY ψY
(
1 + θNη
Y
R
2
)
+ piY (1− ψY )
(
1− θNηYL
2
)
V IR = θIη
X
R
(
1
2
+
(1− ψX)
2
)
+ θIη
Y
R
(
1
2
+
ψY
2
)
+ θIη
X
L
(
1− ψX
2
)
+ θIη
Y
L
(
ψY
2
)
+
(
1−∑K∈{X,Y }∑j∈{L,R} θIηKj
2
)
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Differentiating, these and using that η(e) = e, we obtain that:
∂V NR
∂eXR
=
θNpiX(1− ψX)
2
∂V NR
∂eYR
=
θNpiY ψY
2
∂V IR
∂eXR
=
θI(1− ψX)
2
∂V NR
∂eYR
=
θIψY
2
substituting into the first order condition, we obtain:
(1− α)θNpiX(1− ψX)
2
+
αθI(1− ψX)
2
− (1− α)θNpiY ψY
2
− αθIψY
2
+ λR − µR = 0
this can be rewritten as:
(1− α)θN
2
[piX(1− ψX − ψY )− (piY − piX)ψY ] + αθI
2
[1− ψX − ψY ] + λR − µR = 0 (4)
Now, piY > piX and ψX + ψY > 1 by assumption. Therefore, it follows that the first two
square bracketed terms of equation (4) must both be negative. Now λR ≥ 0, µR ≥ 0 and
λR = 0 unless e
X
R = 0 and µR = 0 unless e
X
R = 1. Therefore it follows that equation (4)
can only be satisfied if eXR = 0, in which case it follows that e
Y
R = 1. This completes the
first step.
Step 2: As in step 1, we differentiate the vote share functions in equations (1) and
(2) and substitute into the first order condition (3) for party L. This gives the expression
(1− α)θN
2
[piXψX − piY (1− ψY )] + αθI
2
[ψX + ψY − 1] = µL − λL (5)
Note that ψX +ψY −1 > 0. Suppose that piXψX−piY (1−ψY ) < 0 is strictly negative.
Then, the left hand side of equation (5) is strictly increasing in α, and will be negative
for α = 0 and positive for α = 1. Then, by the intermediate value theorem, there is a
cutoff α? ∈ (0, 1) such that the left hand side of (5) is strictly negative for α < α? and
positive for α > α?.Now λL ≥ 0, µL ≥ 0 and λL = 0 unless eXL = 0 and µL = 0 unless
eXL = 1. Then, it follows that it must be optimal for L to choose e
X
L = 1 if α > α
? and
optimal for L to choose eXL = 0 (and therefore e
Y
L = 1) when α < α
?.
Finally, suppose that piXψX − piY (1 − ψY ) ≥ 0. Then, since by assumption α > 0,
and ψX +ψY − 1 > 0, it follows that the left hand side of equation (5) is strictly positive.
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Then, by the same line of argument as above, it must be the case that choosing eXL = 1 is
optimal for party L. Then, we put α? = 0 and conclude that L optimally chooses eXL = 1
if and only if α > α?.
B Proof of Proposition 2
First we show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. Then, we derive comparative
statics. We focus on party L. The argument for party R is similar. Differentiating the
vote share functions (1) and (2) with respect to eXL , e
Y
L , we obtain:
∂V NL
∂eXL
=
θNpiXψXη
X′
L
2
∂V NL
∂eYL
=
θNpiY (1− ψY )ηY ′L
2
=
θN(1− piX)(1− ψY )ηY ′L
2
∂V IL
∂eXL
=
θIψXη
X′
L
2
∂V NL
∂eYL
=
θI(1− ψY )ηY ′L
2
where, in a slight abuse of notation, ηK′L represents η
′(eKL ). Since η(·) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave, with lime↑1 η′(e) = 0, it follows that ηK′L is a positive and strictly
decreasing function of eKL and η
K′
L = 0 when e
K
L = 1.
For party L, the first order condition (3) can be written as:
(1− α)∂V
N
L
∂eXL
+ α
∂V IL
∂eXL
− (1− α)∂V
N
L
∂eYL
− α∂V
N
L
∂eYL
+ = µL − λL (6)
where λL ≥ 0, µL ≥ 0 and λLeXL = 0 and µL(1− eXL ) = 0.
Impose eYL = 1− eXL . Then, by the properties of ηK′L just noted, it follows that the left
hand side of equation (6) is strictly positive when eXL = 0, strictly decreasing in e
X
L and
strictly negative when eXL = 1. Then, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists
an eXL ∈ (0, 1) for which the left hand side of equation (6) is zero. At this value of eXL ,
setting λL = µL = 0 solves the Kuhn Tucker conditions. Furthermore, since η is strictly
concave, the vote share of party L is a strictly concave function of (eXL , e
Y
L ). Given strict
concavity of the objective function, it is a standard result that the optimum is unique.
Therefore it follows that eXL ∈ (0, 1) for which the left hand side of (6) is zero represents
the unique optimal decision by party L.
The derivatives of V NL and V
I
L with respect to e
X
L , e
Y
L do not depend on the decisions of
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party R. Therefore, it follows that the unique optimal choice of (eXL , e
Y
L ) for party L does
not depend on the decisions of party R. By a symmetrical argument, the unique optimal
choice of party R does not depend on the decisions of party L. Then, it follows that a
unique equilibrium must exist in which eKj ∈ (0, 1) for each j ∈ {L,R}, K ∈ {X, Y }
The comparative static results follow immediately from applying the implicit function
theorem to equation (6). We have shown that at the equilibrium the left hand side of
(6) equals zero, and furthermore that the left hand side of (6) is strictly decreasing in
eXL (after imposing e
Y
L = 1 − eXL ). Then, the implicit function theorem implies that the
change of the equilibrium eXL when some parameter t is changed must have the same
sign as the partial derivative of the left hand side of equation (6) with respect to the
parameter t.
Using the derivatives of V NL and V
I
L with respect to e
X
L and e
Y
L and the properties of
ηK′L , it is immediate that the left hand side of equation (6) is strictly increasing in piX , ψX
and ψY . The comparative static results for e
X
L follow immediately, as do the results for
eYL since e
Y
L = 1− eXL . The results for party R follow by a symmetrical argument.
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